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Abstract 
Assessment of unfair competitive practices in airline markets has traditionally been based on the 
analysis of changes average fares, revenue and traffic following low-fare entry. This paper 
demonstrates the severe limitations of using such measures. In particular, our case studies show 
that despite very different perceptions by some analysts of apparent incumbent carrier response 
to entry, average fares, revenues and traffic measures showed very similar patterns of change in 
the cases studied.  We then use a competitive airline market simulation to illustrate the 
importance of often ignored factors – revenue management and the flows of connecting network 
passengers on the flight legs affected by low-fare entry – in explaining the effects of entry on 
these aggregate measures of airline performance.  These simulation results further reinforce the 
danger in using such measures as indicators of predatory behavior in airline markets. 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of low-fare, low-cost airlines throughout the 1990s has been dramatic. In the US, 
low-fare carrier market shares have increased from just over 5% in 1990 to about 25% in 2004. 
In Europe, Asia and Australia, low-fare carriers are blossoming.  With the rapid growth of new 
entrants, traditional network carriers must fight to remain competitive and are therefore making 
changes to adapt to this new competitive environment. These changes include fare structure 
changes and cost reductions.  
While low-fare carriers expand all over the world, regulators are increasingly concerned with the 
effects of low-fare entry on the competitiveness of the airline industry and the potential for 
predatory practices by incumbents. As a matter of policy, regulatory bodies – such as the US 
Department of Transportation – and researchers have attempted to devise tests or guidelines in 
order to determine whether predation occurs in airline markets. These tests attempt to compare 
pre- and post-entry incumbent revenues, costs and capacity to make a determination as to 
whether the incumbent engaged in predatory behavior.  The analysis of traditional aggregate 
measures of airline performance (such as total local market revenues, average fare in the local 
market and traffic on each individual airline) has typically been the foundation of such 
comparisons. However, these tests have ignored the effects of network passenger traffic and 
revenue management on the incumbent carriers. 
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This article illustrates the limitations of using traditional measures of airline performance to 
assess the response of incumbent carriers to low-fare entry and demonstrates the impacts of new 
entrant capacity, revenue management and flows of network passengers on individual carrier 
performance. This article also strives to provide policy-makers with guidance and insights on the 
competitive importance of these previously ignored factors. The results show that traditional 
proposed tests of predation at best indicate the potential for predatory behavior, but do not 
provide a conclusive indication of predation. 
2. Literature Review 
 
Despite McGee’s 1958 argument that predation was often an unprofitable business strategy 
unlikely to occur except under unusual market conditions, such as legal barriers to mergers and 
acquisitions, the literature on predation has been plentiful. The development of game theory in 
the 1960s and 1970s helped demonstrate that predation might lead to a rational equilibrium under 
specific conditions such as the “long purse” assumption (Edwards, 1955) or reputations models, 
as described by Kreps and Wilson (1982). In an effort to identify predatory pricing and predation 
in its more general sense, Areeda and Turner (1975, 1976 and 1978) designed a test of predatory 
pricing, based on the comparison of price and marginal cost. In 1977, Williamson suggested a 
short-term output-maximizing rule as an alternative to Areeda and Turner’s marginal cost test. 
Baumol (1979), Joskow and Klevorick (1979), and others also discussed predatory pricing in its 
more general economic setting and proposed tests or rules for evaluating whether a pricing 
strategy is predatory. Most of the research on predation thus focuses on the comparison of 
revenues and costs.  
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Specific research on entry in airline markets has focused mostly on the effects of entry on traffic 
and fares. While many of these studies indicated a growing concern with respect to unfair 
competition and predatory pricing, few of these research efforts focused on identifying and 
understanding the dynamics of airline markets, and how they affect competition. For instance, 
Bailey et al. (1985), Morrison and Winston (1990), Windle and Dresner (1995), Perry (1995), 
and Oster and Strong (2001) all examine the impact of entry on average fares and traffic, 
distinguishing between entry by a low-fare carrier and a network carrier, and touch upon the 
issue of predation. Dodgson et al. (1991) provide a definition of predatory practices in the airline 
industry and concepts of relevance in identifying these practices. In addition, they highlight the 
irrelevance of cost-based tests of predation in airline markets. 
Despite their recognition of airline-specific characteristics, none of these studies identify revenue 
management and network traffic flow effects as factors of critical importance in understanding 
and explaining the apparent response of incumbent carriers to low-fare entry. Airline revenue 
management started with overbooking research in the 1950s with Beckman’s (1958) static 
optimization model. Later statistical models include the work of Taylor (1962), Simon (1968), 
Rothstein (1968, 1985) and Vickrey (1972). The primary tool of revenue management is fare 
class mix seat inventory control, the practice of determining the revenue maximizing number of 
seats to make available for each product (fare class) on each future flight leg departure. 
Littlewood (1972) and Smith (1984) provided the basis for the initial research on the topic of 
revenue management forecasting, which is used as an input to seat inventory control algorithms. 
Belobaba (1987a, 1987b) published the first leg-based seat inventory management algorithm for 
nested fare classes, known as the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue algorithm (EMSR). Building 
on this research, Belobaba (1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1994), Curry (1990), Brumelle and McGill 
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(1993) and others developed heuristic extensions as well as theoretically optimal formulations of 
the multiple nested class seat protection model.  
Network revenue management constitutes a significant advance in the management of airline 
seat inventory when connecting passenger itineraries are involved. As a first step towards the 
development and implementation of network revenue management, Smith, Leimkuhler and 
Darrow (1992) described the notion of “virtual nesting”.   Williamson (1992) proposed a variety 
of OD control methods for connecting airline networks.  More recent research focusing on the 
mathematics of network optimization applied to network revenue management includes the work 
of Gallego and Van Ryzin (1997), de Boer (2003), and Bertsimas and Popescu (2003).  
For more detailed descriptions of previous research on airline revenue management, the reader is 
referred to McGill and Van Ryzin (1999), who provide a thorough review of the science of 
revenue management and its evolution. Belobaba (2002) also reviews the state of the practice as 
it relates to airline network revenue management. 
Thus, past efforts to investigate competitive behavior in airline markets have been disconnected 
from the practice of revenue management and have involved almost exclusively the analysis of 
aggregate market measures of average fares and traffic. Overall, none of these studies have 
provided a satisfactory method to evaluate the possibility of predation, given the dynamics of 
airline networks and revenue management. More importantly, none of the previous research has 
attempted to estimate the impact of these factors on apparent incumbent performance after entry. 
3. Case Studies 
A two-tier approach was chosen to describe the effects of low-fare entry in airline markets. In a 
first step, the analysis of two comparable markets allows us to highlight the potential differences 
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in the response of incumbent carriers to low-fare entry, as well as the perception of the severity 
of such responses on the part of policy-makers. In a second step, a simulation model is used to 
study the effects of revenue management and connecting network flows on individual carrier 
performance in markets with low-fare competition. 
Several studies (Perry, 1995; Oster and Strong, 2001; Gorin, 2004) of airline markets with low-
fare new entrant competition have concluded that low-fare entry usually leads to: 
• An increase in total local market and incumbent local traffic 
• A decrease in average fares, both at the market level and on the incumbent carriers 
• An increase in total aircraft departures in the market 
• An increase in total market revenues 
In our case study, a detailed analysis of, and comparison between, two markets with low-fare 
competition provides an illustration of the complexities of competition in airline markets.  
In the first case, Delta Air Lines faced competition from ValuJet in its Atlanta-Orlando market. 
In the first quarter of 1994, ValuJet entered the Atlanta-Orlando market with 25 weekly 
roundtrips (as many as four daily roundtrips on certain days) using DC9-32 aircraft (with a 
capacity of about 115 seats). ValuJet entered the market with substantially lower fares (~50%) 
than those offered by the other nonstop carriers in the market (Delta Air Lines and Trans World 
Airlines). Almost ten years later, ValuJet is still operating in the market (under the name 
AirTran), as is Delta. 
In the second case, Spirit Airlines entered the Detroit-Boston market on April 15, 1996 with a 
DC9-21 aircraft (90 seats) and offered a single daily roundtrip flight. This low cost, low fare 
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carrier entered the market with considerably lower fares (~75%) than those formerly offered by 
Northwest, the only airline previously offering nonstop service. On September 8, 1996, Spirit 
exited the market, less than five months after its entry. 
The severity of the competitive response by the dominant incumbents in these two markets 
appears on the surface to be very different. On the one hand, Delta Air Lines has been viewed as 
a relatively lenient competitor with respect to its response to low-fare entry, as evidenced by the 
continued growth of Air Tran in Atlanta, Delta’s primary hub. On the other hand, Northwest 
Airlines is considered a far more aggressive competitor, as shown by the numerous studies 
describing its anti-competitive behavior. The Detroit-Boston market is no exception and is 
further described by Oster and Strong (2001) as potentially exhibiting anticompetitive practices. 
Despite the different perceptions of the response of incumbent carriers in these particular 
markets, Table 1 shows that traffic, average fares and revenues paint an incomplete picture of the 
impacts of entry and provide no information regarding the specifics of the incumbents’ response. 
In particular, a year-over-year comparison of Delta and Northwest’s traffic, fares and revenues – 
which corrects for seasonal trends – shows that these measures of airline performance changed in 
very similar ways after entry in both cases. As shown in Table 1, the measures of traffic, average 
market fare and revenues experienced remarkably similar patterns in these two examples of low-
fare entry, despite widespread perceptions that Northwest’s response in the Detroit-Boston 
market was much more severe, and potentially anti-competitive. 
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Year-Over-Year Percent Change 
Airline 
Traffic Average Fare Revenues 
Delta 
ATL-MCO +59.7% -51.3% -22.2% 
Northwest 
DTW-BOS +63.3% -48.8% -17.4% 
Table 1: Relative change in quarterly traffic, average fare, departures and revenues on the 
incumbent network carriers (based on US Department of Transportation DB1A database, 
see Gorin, 2004 for more detail) 
Despite the similarity in the response of incumbent carriers, as depicted by these aggregate 
measures, Delta and Northwest were perceived as very different competitors, as mentioned  In 
addition, these aggregate measures do not provide any information regarding the pricing 
response (or lack thereof) of the incumbent carriers to low-fare entry, let alone the intent of these 
carriers to force their low-fare competitors out of the market.  
In the following sections we simulate entry in both a single market environment as well as in a 
full network environment in order to illustrate the dangers in using these measures as indications 
of the nature of the response by incumbent carriers. Our results also show how flows of network 
passengers and revenue management affect these measures of airline performance and can distort 
the perceptions of entry in airline markets. 
4. Simulation 
Unlike analytical models, which are limited to static observations that overlook the effects of 
passenger booking patterns and the effects of airline revenue management practices, simulations 
allows for a dynamic representation of competitive airline markets. In addition, static models 
cannot accurately model demand, booking behaviors, forecasting, and competitive airline 
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interactions, and inevitably lead to inconclusive or even misleading findings due to the necessary 
simplifications required for the models to remain tractable. 
Rather than oversimplifying, we use the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS), a 
simulator of a competitive airline network. Abundant literature is available on PODS, including a 
detailed description of the underlying algorithms (Hopperstad, 1997 and 2000), general 
discussions of the structure of PODS by Belobaba and Wilson (1997) and Lee (1998), an 
explanation of the forecasting models used in PODS by Zickus (1998) and Skwarek (1996) and a 
validation of the passenger choice model by Carrier (2003). In all these references, various 
revenue management methods commonly used by airlines and simulated in PODS are also 
described.  
In the following simulations, we assume that the market does not structurally change after entry. 
For example, we assume that conditional passenger preference towards any particular airline 
remains unchanged by entry: Given that the passenger does not choose to travel on Airline 3 
(new entrant), his/her preference between airlines 1 and 2 (incumbent network carriers) is the 
same as his/her preference when there are only airlines 1 and 2 operating in the market. 
Similarly, we assume that total potential demand remains a function of price, as governed by the 
existing price-demand curve in the market, irrespective of the number of competitors in the 
market.  
The demand for air travel is split into business demand and leisure demand, where 35% of total 
demand is business oriented while the remaining 65% of demand is leisure demand. Business 
passengers are characterized by a higher willingness-to-pay as well as a greater sensitivity to 
restrictions imposed on fare products offered by the airlines. While these assumptions are not 
overly restrictive, it may be argued that low-fare entry has a structural effect on the market. For 
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tractability reasons, and since there is little evidence of this in the literature discussed previously, 
we do not model any structural change. 
4.1. Simulation of Entry in a Single Market Environment  
In this first scenario, airlines operate in a single market environment, where two initial 
competitors (one nonstop – Airline 1, the other one connecting – Airline 2) are faced with low-
fare entry. The new entrant carrier (Airline 3) enters the market with a schedule identical to that 
of the nonstop incumbent carrier (to eliminate potential schedule effects) and with different 
aircraft capacity levels.  
4.1.1. Simulated Scenarios 
We simulated two competitive scenarios to allow comparisons “before” and “after” new entry 
into an airline market.  In the base case, two incumbent airlines compete, one of which offers 
only nonstop service in the market (Airline 1) while its competitor offers only connecting service 
(Airline 2). In the second scenario, we add a third carrier – the new entrant – which then also 
offers nonstop service in this market, and competes with both incumbents but more directly with 
the nonstop incumbent carrier. 
The purpose of Airline 2 – the connecting incumbent carrier – is to act as a “relief valve” for the 
excess market demand and to allow passengers to have an alternative to the nonstop carrier. 
Airline 2 thus represents all the connecting alternatives available to passengers in a more realistic 
market. As a result, we assume that Airline 2 offers a large capacity relative to demand in this 
market (identical to that of the nonstop incumbent carrier), even though its connecting flight 
options (paths) are far less desirable than those of Airline 1. The loads, revenues and overall 
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performance of Airline 2 are therefore not of particular interest in this discussion. From here on, 
we thus refer to the nonstop incumbent simply as the incumbent carrier. 
 
Baseline Case: No Entrant Competition 
Without new entrant competition, the market is served by two competing incumbent carriers, 
each offering three daily departures. Airline 1 offers three daily nonstop flights while its 
competitor offers three connecting flights, each with 30 seats on each flight, for a total of 90 
seats per day in the market for each carrier. Table 2 summarizes the frequency, capacity and 
baseline pricing of the incumbent carriers. 
CARRIER CAPACITY FREQUENCY PRICING 
Airline 1 90 seats (3x30) Three daily flights 
Airline 2 90 seats (3x30) Three daily flights 
Four fare classes with four 
different fare levels 
Y, B, M and Q 
(see Table 3) 
Table 2: Capacity, frequency and pricing overview without entrant competition 
 
All other characteristics are exactly the same for both airlines. There is no passenger preference 
for either airline, other than the preference induced by path quality (nonstop vs. connecting 
paths).   
The baseline prices for each fare class are set as shown in Table 3, along with the restrictions 
associated with each individual fare class in this baseline scenario. Y class is the unrestricted fare 
class in the market; while B, M and Q classes are increasingly restricted. The more restrictive the 
fare class in terms of advance purchase requirements and restrictions (roundtrip, Saturday night 
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stay, and non-refundability requirements), the cheaper the associated fare. We refer to this fare 
structure as the standard fare structure. 
 
Restrictions 
Fare Class Fare 
Roundtrip 
Requirement 
Saturday 
Night Stay 
Non 
Refundable 
Advance 
Purchase 
Y $261 No No No No 
B $135 Yes No No 7 days 
M $92 Yes Yes No 14 days 
Q $63 Yes Yes Yes 21 days 
Table 3: Fare classes, sample associated fares and restrictions for the standard fare 
structure in the baseline scenario 
 
As described in most of the literature on PODS, these fare settings lead to a lower relative total 
disutility (sum of actual fare paid and disutility “costs” of restrictions) associated with higher 
fare classes (Y and B) for business passengers, and conversely, a lower relative disutility of 
lower fare classes (M and Q) for leisure passengers.  That is, the total disutility costs of the sum 
of the actual fare paid and fare restrictions on the lowest fares are still perceived by leisure 
passengers to be lower than the total cost of the unrestricted “full fare”. 
Finally, since the purpose of this paper is in part to examine the impact of revenue management 
on “traditional” measures of incumbent performance, we allow the incumbent carriers to either 
accept requests for seats on a first-come, first-served basis (FCFS), or to use Fare Class Revenue 
Management (FCRM). In the case of FCFS seat request acceptance, passengers book seats in a 
first-come, first-served manner, and the only controls that airlines can use to differentiate 
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between fare products are advance purchase requirements that effectively close down a fare class 
beyond a given deadline, or restrictions that have an impact on the passengers’ buying decision. 
In the case of FCRM, the simulated airlines use a combination of Booking Curve detruncation, 
Pick-up forecasting, and Expected Marginal Seat Revenue algorithm (Belobaba, 1987), as 
extensively described in the PODS and Revenue Management literature (e.g. Gorin, 2000) and 
used by many airlines. Under Fare Class Revenue Management, advance purchase requirements 
and restrictions still apply, and are reinforced by revenue management controls to protect seats 
for later-booking high-fare passengers, in turn limiting seats made available to early-booking 
low-fare passengers.  
New Entrant Scenario 
In this second scenario, we add a third carrier, referred to as the new entrant. Upon entry, the 
new entrant carrier offers three daily nonstop flights scheduled at the exact same times as the 
nonstop incumbent carrier’s flights (Airline 1). We chose to mirror the nonstop incumbent’s 
schedule in order to eliminate the effect of schedule preference on passenger choice. In this 
scenario, passengers now have the option of flying on the nonstop incumbent carrier, its nonstop 
new entrant competitor, or the connecting incumbent carrier. 
The new entrant offers a two-tier fare structure as follows (c.f. Table 4): 
1. Fully unrestricted Y class fare set at $135 (the same fare as the B class fare on the 
incumbent carrier in the base case), approximately 48% lower than the previous Y fare 
2. Restricted M class fare (roundtrip and Saturday night stay requirements with 14 days 
advance purchase) priced $10 below the base case Q fare on the incumbent, at $53 
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Restrictions 
Fare Class Fare Roundtrip 
Requirement 
Saturday 
Night Stay 
Non 
Refundable 
Advance 
Purchase 
Y $135 No No No No 
M $53 Yes Yes No 14 days 
Table 4: Two-tier fare structure details (new entrant carrier) 
 
This two-tier fare structure is based on our observation that many low-fare new entrants typically 
offer a simplified fare structure, as compared to that of incumbent carriers. The notion of 
simplification does not necessarily involve the removal of all restrictions and advance purchase 
requirements, but rather a decrease in the number of fare classes offered, and consequently in the 
complexity of the fare structure. In addition, low-fare new entrants typically offer substantially 
lower fares relative to the incumbents’ standard fare structure.  
In order to test the effect of the entrant’s capacity on market performance, we also simulated 
various capacity levels offered by the new entrant on its three daily flights. New entrant capacity 
ranges between 15 seats per flight and 50 seats per flight, with intermediate capacity settings of 
25 and 30 seats. 
Finally, we let the new entrant carrier either accept seat requests on a first-come, first-served 
basis, or use Fare Class Revenue Management.  In the simulations presented here, we assumed 
that all competitors have the same revenue management system (or lack thereof), or that the 
incumbent carriers use Fare Class Revenue Management while the new entrant does not.  
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Incumbent Response to Entry 
Upon entry, we assume that the incumbents either fully match the entrant’s fare structure or only 
respond with a limited fare match. The limited match response represents the less aggressive 
response whereby the incumbent carriers only match the lowest available fare in the market in 
their most restrictive fare class. As a result, the incumbent carriers are offering a fare of $53 in 
their Q class, which is more restrictive than the M class fare offered on the new entrant carrier at 
the same price. Table 5 summarizes the type of service, frequency, capacity, fares and revenue 
management approach of each carrier in the competitive case, under the limited match 
assumption. 
Fares by Fare Class Competitive 
Case Service 
Frequency 
& Capacity Y B M Q 
Revenue 
Management 
Airline 1 Nonstop 3x30 $261 $135 $92 $53 FCFS or FCRM 
Airline 2 Connecting 3x30 $261 $135 $92 $53 FCFS or FCRM 
Airline 3 
(New Entrant) Nonstop 3x15-25-30or50 $135 n/a $53 n/a FCFS or FCRM 
Table 5: Competitive case summary (limited match response from incumbents) 
4.1.2. Results 
In the following paragraphs, we first illustrate how average fares can be misleading in 
interpreting the response of incumbent carriers to low-fare entry, as simulated in the single 
market environment described above. We then highlight the impact of revenue management 
controls on average fares, revenues and traffic.  In the next section, we extend the results to a 
large network environment to further explore the effects of network flows of passengers on these 
measures.  
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A common misconception of competition in airline markets, and more particularly of low-fare 
entry into airline markets, is that lower average fares on the incumbent carrier (relative to the 
new entrant carrier) are indicative of an aggressive pricing response. Our results show that, even 
in the case of a limited response by the incumbent carrier, its average fare (as well as revenues 
and traffic) is severely affected by low-fare competition in the market (when all carriers use 
revenue management).  Figure 1 shows that the incumbent carrier’s average fare decreases 
significantly following entry by a low-fare competitor and remains consistently lower than that 
of the new entrant carrier. The explanation of this result lies in the more attractive entrant fare 
structure simulated in this case, which leads to the diversion of all but low-fare traffic (as limited 
by the entrant’s capacity) from the incumbent carrier to the new entrant competitor. As a result, 
the incumbent carrier’s average fare decreases relative to pre-entry, and remains consistently 
lower than that of the new entrant carrier (which carries high-fare business traffic previously 
traveling on the incumbent). As new entrant capacity increases (relative to incumbent capacity), 
the entrant’s revenue management system recognizes the need to fill more seats, and makes more 
low-fare seats available on the new entrant, hence the decrease in average fare with increasing 
new entrant capacity.  
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Figure 1: Average fare on nonstop incumbent and entrant carrier as a function of relative 
entrant capacity in the limited match case 
The impact on incumbent and entrant revenues and traffic is shown in Figure 2, and follows from 
the effect of entry on incumbent and entrant average fares. 
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Figure 2: Revenues and traffic on nonstop incumbent and new entrant as a function of 
relative entrant capacity in the limited match case 
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These simulation results illustrate the effects of entry on average fares, revenues and traffic 
under the assumption of a limited fare response, and further demonstrate that changes in average 
fares, revenues and traffic cannot provide reliable information pertaining to the nature of an 
incumbent’s response to low-fare entry.  
The results also demonstrate how the effects of entry on incumbent and new entrant average 
fares, revenues and traffic are directly affected by the use of revenue management techniques by 
the competitors.  Figure 3 shows the incumbent carrier’s average fare as a function of its revenue 
management system and that of its competitor. In particular, when none of the carriers use 
revenue management, the incumbent carrier’s average market fare increases with increasing new 
entrant capacity. This effect is explained by the fact that as the new entrant carrier increases its 
capacity, the availability of seats in the market increases, and low fare passengers therefore split 
between the two carriers in the market. Since business passengers are assumed to book later, the 
greater capacity increases the availability of seats later in the booking process, making these 
seats available to business passengers, and consequently increasing the average fare on the 
incumbent carrier as entrant capacity increases. 
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Figure 3: Incumbent carrier average fare as a function of relative entrant capacity and 
competitive revenue management under the limited match case 
When only the incumbent carriers use revenue management, the ability of the incumbent to 
forecast the arrival of high-fare demand later in booking process allows it to maintain a high 
average fare in the market. Revenues, however, decrease following entry but remain the highest 
of all three cases simulated (as shown in Figure 4). 
Finally, when all carriers use revenue management, the incumbent’s average market fare 
decreases following entry (up to an entrant capacity of about 80% of the incumbent’s capacity) 
and remains stable as new entrant capacity increases. This effect is a consequence of the 
combination of a more attractive fare structure on the new entrant carrier and its use of revenue 
management. The entrant forecasts late-booking high-fare passengers, but, given its small 
capacity, is only able to accommodate a small portion of that traffic. The incumbent carrier 
carries the remainder of that traffic (since it also forecasts this passenger demand), as long as the 
new entrant’s capacity remains small. When the entrant’s capacity exceeds total business 
demand in the market, it diverts all of the business traffic and the incumbent carrier is forced to 
carry almost exclusively low-fare traffic. In this case, the use of revenue management on the 
incumbent cannot make up for its less attractive fare structure relative to the low-fare new 
entrant carrier.  
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Figure 4: Incumbent carrier revenues and traffic as a function of relative entrant capacity 
and competitive revenue management situation 
Figure 4 shows the effects of entry on incumbent revenues and traffic as a function of the 
competitive revenue management situation as well as the new entrant’s capacity relative to the 
incumbent carrier. It shows in particular that the incumbent carrier’s revenues are consistently 
highest when it uses revenue management while the new entrant does not. Traffic, on the other 
hand, is highest on the incumbent carrier when it accepts passenger bookings on a first-come, 
first-served basis. Figure 4 also shows that the incumbent carrier’s revenues are higher when 
none of the competitors use revenue management than when both carriers use revenue 
management. It is important to stress here that these results do not imply that the incumbent 
carrier would achieve higher revenues if it did not use revenue management when the new 
entrant does. In fact, our results show (see Gorin, 2004) that revenues would be significantly 
lower on the incumbent carrier under this scenario and thus reinforce the importance of revenue 
management, particularly in a low-fare environment. 
Our results for the single market scenario simulated thus highlight the significant impact of 
revenue management and relative entrant capacity on traditional measures of airline performance 
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(average fares, revenues and traffic), and thus emphasize the dangers in using these measures as 
indications of predatory behavior in airline markets. 
 
4.2. Simulation of Entry in a Network Environment 
We now extend our simulations to a larger network environment in order to illustrate the effects 
of network flows of passengers combined with revenue management on average fares, traffic and 
revenues. 
4.2.1. Simulated Scenarios 
In the network scenario, the two previously described incumbent carriers operate a full hub 
network schedule, each offering connecting opportunities through its hub. The new entrant 
carrier (Airline 3) offers only nonstop service in a subset of Airline 1’s local markets, 
specifically the ten markets with the highest local demand from Airline 1’s hub. 
The network in which the three competing carriers operate includes 40 cities, in addition to two 
individual airline hubs. Figure 5 shows a geographical layout of the network overlaid on a map 
of the US with the two incumbent carriers’ route structure. It also shows the two incumbent 
network airlines’ hubs, H1 and H2.  
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Figure 5: Simulated airline networks 
Traffic on this network flows only from West to East such that each network airline offers 
service only from western spoke cities (1 through 20) to its hub, and from the hub to eastern 
spoke cities. Nonstop service is available from cities 1 through 20 to hubs H1 and H2, on Airline 
1 and Airline 2 respectively, and from hubs H1 and H2 to cities 21 through 40, on Airline 1 and 
Airline 2 respectively. In addition, Airlines 1 and 2 also offer hub-to-hub service between H1 
and H2. As a result, passengers traveling from a western spoke to an eastern spoke must connect 
either through H1 or H2. Passengers traveling from a western spoke to H1 or H2 can either travel 
nonstop on the appropriate carrier, or connect through the other carrier’s hub. Finally, passengers 
traveling from either hub to an eastern city also have the option of flying nonstop from that hub 
or connecting through the competing carrier’s hub. 
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The new entrant carrier, Airline 3, offers nonstop service in the top ten markets with the largest 
local demands from H1 to eastern cities (also shown on Figure 5), and therefore competes 
directly with Airline 1’s nonstop service in these local markets. 
Each of the two incumbent network carriers offers three daily departures in each of the 482 
markets served in this network, either as nonstop or connecting itineraries. Flight departures are 
timed so that each network airline’s hub operates three daily connecting banks allowing for 
connections from western cities towards eastern cities. The new entrant’s flights coincide with 
the incumbent carrier’s flight departures in each of the local markets with low-fare competition, 
but the new entrant does not carry any connecting traffic from Airline 1 or Airline 2. In other 
words, interlining is not allowed in this simulation (including between Airline 1 and Airline 2). 
The incumbent carriers use a total of 126 flights to serve all 482 markets with three frequencies 
each and with 100 seats per flight. The new entrant carrier operates 30 flight legs in its ten 
markets. All new entrant flights have the same capacity, which we varied in the simulations 
between 30, 50 and 70 seats per flight to assess the effect of new entrant capacity on incumbent 
and new entrant performance. 
The pricing strategies of incumbent and new entrant carriers are the same as in the single market 
case -- the new entrant carrier enters the market with a two-tier fare structure (based on the 
incumbents’ pre-entry standard fare structure) that the incumbent network carriers either partially 
or fully match, but only in the ten markets with low-fare entrant competition. In the other 472 
markets without low-fare competition, the incumbent carriers maintain their standard fare 
structure, as previously described (c.f. Table 2). In order to evaluate the impact of revenue 
management methods, the incumbent carriers now either jointly use leg-based fare class revenue 
management (FCRM) or network revenue management (referred to as Net. RM). The new 
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entrant carrier always uses FCRM as its revenue management method. In the case of network 
revenue management, we use a combination of Booking Curve detruncation, Pick-up forecasting, 
and Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting algorithm (Williamson, 1992), as implemented by 
many airlines. 
4.2.2. Results 
Our simulations of a large network environment allow us to model the effects of flows of 
network passengers and thus observe the added effect of these network synergies on incumbent 
carrier revenues and traffic. Figure 6 shows the difference between local market revenue losses 
and total network revenue losses on the incumbent carrier following low-fare entry in a portion 
of its network – we refer to this difference as incumbent “revenue recovery”. The results clearly 
indicate that the incumbent carrier was able to recover a significant amount of revenue from its 
connecting network passengers, and that the amount of the revenue recovery depends on the new 
entrant’s capacity as well as the competitive revenue management situation. 
Figure 7 shows how flows of network passengers affect the incumbent’s revenues as well as how 
revenue management changes the composition of local and connecting traffic to improve the mix 
of passengers from a revenue perspective. In particular, in both cases pictured in Figure 7, 
following low-fare entry, the incumbent carrier loses local traffic to the new entrant carrier, and 
its revenue management system then allows more connecting traffic to replace the loss in local 
traffic. Network revenue management further recognizes the difference between low-fare local 
traffic and higher fare connecting traffic and thus forces even more local traffic off the 
incumbent carrier in favor of more connecting traffic, which leads to the greater revenue 
differential pictured in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Incumbent revenue recovery, i.e. difference between total network revenue losses 
and local market revenue losses on the incumbent network carrier 
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Figure 7: Effect of entry and revenue management on local and connecting incumbent 
network carrier traffic 
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In summary, the incumbent carrier can use Network RM methods to replace local market traffic 
with connecting traffic to mitigate the impact of entry on network revenues. As a consequence, 
the incumbent’s average local market fare is less affected by entry, as it focuses on high-fare 
local traffic. Local market revenues, however, tend to suffer more from entry than in the single 
market case, as incumbent foregoes low fare traffic in favor of more lucrative network 
passengers.  
These simulation results thus highlight the effects of flows of network passengers combined with 
competitive revenue management, pricing response and relative entrant capacity on incumbent 
and new entrant measures of average fares, revenues and traffic. The results also emphasize the 
limited information provided by these measures with respect to each carrier’s actual performance 
and response to entry. 
 
5. Applications to Studies of Competition in Airline Markets 
Typical studies of competition in airline markets (e.g. US DOT, 2001) identify predatory conduct 
based on observations of average market fares, traffic and revenues, as previously discussed. In 
this section, three typical observations leading to suspicion of predatory conduct are discussed. 
Our results show that these findings, if misinterpreted, may lead to erroneous conclusions 
regarding predatory behavior in airline markets.  
Response to entry raises suspicion when: 
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1. The incumbent carrier’s average market fare is lower than that of the new entrant carrier. 
This is often seen as an indication of aggressive pricing response from the incumbent 
carrier. 
2. The incumbent carrier’s average market fare decreases after entry. The decrease in 
incumbent average fare is assumed to reflect an aggressive incumbent pricing response. 
3. The incumbent carrier’s local market traffic increases, but its local market revenues 
decrease. Decreasing revenues and increasing traffic are again presumed to reflect an 
overly aggressive pricing response leading to greater traffic but lower revenues. 
We have already explained why the first conclusion does not hold when considering competition 
in airline markets, as it fails to account for revenue management and flows of network 
passengers. We now discuss each the remaining two statements and explain how they can lead to 
erroneous conclusions regarding the nature of the incumbent carrier’s response to low-fare entry. 
Based on our simulation results, which do not imply any predatory motive on the part of the 
incumbent carrier and further allow only a limited set of responses from the incumbent carriers 
(constant incumbent capacity, limited or full match of entrant fares), we demonstrate how the 
above guidelines can lead to the conclusion that the incumbent carrier responded to low-fare 
entry with predatory practices, when in fact it did not. 
5.1. Decrease in Incumbent Average Fare as an Indication of Predatory Pricing 
Our case studies and simulation results have shown that low-fare entry is usually accompanied 
by a decrease in the incumbent’s average market fare. This effect is often construed as an 
indication of aggressive response and potential predatory pricing in response to entry. 
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As shown in Figure 8, a more aggressive response to low-fare entry does not necessarily lead to a 
lower average fare. In the case of entry with a two-tier fare structure with all carriers using fare 
class revenue management, as simulated in Figure 8, the incumbent carrier’s average fare is 
lower under the more aggressive response strategy (full match) only at low entrant capacity. The 
more aggressive incumbent response to entry actually allows the incumbent carrier to maintain a 
higher average market fare when the new entrant carrier chooses to enter the market with a 
relatively high capacity.  
The explanation for this result lies in the number of passengers that are potentially diverted from 
the incumbent carrier. In the limited match case, at high entrant capacity, diversion of traffic 
from the incumbent carrier to the entrant is so high that the effect on the incumbent’s average 
fare is greater than if it had matched the fare structure on the new entrant carrier. The revenue 
management system on the entrant carrier forecasts the late-booking demand, as does the 
incumbent carrier’s system. However, the more attractive fare structure on the entrant (under the 
assumption of a limited response to entry) leads to a diversion of all business traffic towards the 
new entrant carrier. In contrast, when the incumbent fully matches the entrant’s fare structure, it 
can also carry some of the late-booking business traffic.  
Finally, when new entrant capacity is small, matching the fare structure of the entrant actually 
leads to the diversion of the incumbent carrier’s own business traffic towards a lower fare, hence 
the decrease in revenues. 
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Figure 8: Incumbent carrier average fare as a function of the incumbent pricing response 
(single market case) 
5.2. Traffic Increases and Revenue Decreases as Indicators of Aggressiveness of Response to Low-
Fare Entry 
The combination of the effects of low-fare entry on incumbent carrier traffic and revenues is 
often used as a means of identifying predatory responses to entry. For example, an increase in 
traffic accompanied by a decrease in local market traffic could be considered an unprofitable and 
potentially predatory response to entry. However, as shown in Figure 9, under assumptions of 
entry with a two-tier fare structure in the single market case, the full match response, while it is 
the response strategy which leads to an increase in incumbent carrier traffic (and a decrease in 
revenues), is also the response strategy which maximizes incumbent carrier revenues (among the 
simulated alternatives). The less aggressive limited match response does not allow the incumbent 
carrier to retain as much traffic in the local market, which affects its local market revenues. As a 
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result, the combination of a decrease in incumbent carrier revenues and increase in traffic should 
not be used as an indication of predatory behavior. 
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Figure 9: Incumbent carrier traffic and revenues as a function of its pricing response 
(single market case) 
Our simulation results in a large network environment also show that network flows of 
passengers can lead to a greater decrease in local market revenues, but a lesser decrease in total 
network revenues (as highlighted in Figure 6). The trade-off between local and connecting 
passengers – through the use of revenue management – can lead to a greater decrease in local 
market revenues compared to total network revenues, thus further illustrating how revenues 
don’t provide information on the nature of the competitive response of incumbent carriers faced 
with low-fare competition. 
In summary, the traditional indicators of potential predatory conduct, incumbent average fare 
relative to new entrant average fare, decrease in incumbent average fare and decrease in 
incumbent revenues, can be very misleading and potentially lead to erroneous conclusions 
regarding predatory conduct in the airline industry.  
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6. Conclusions 
Our results clearly show that claims of predatory behavior in airline markets cannot be evaluated 
using traditional approaches to predation based on revenues and costs. Furthermore, revenue 
management and flows of network passengers add to the complexity of competition in airline 
markets and further blur the conclusions that might be drawn from the analysis of traditional 
measures of airline performance such as average fares, revenues or traffic.  
Our results have shown that these measures provide little information regarding the performance 
of individual carriers, or the nature of their response to low-fare entry. In addition, changes in 
these measures after entry are affected by a combination of factors including entrant capacity 
relative to incumbent carrier capacity, pricing strategy of incumbent and entrant, competitive 
revenue management and flows of network passengers. 
In particular, the effects of revenue management and flows of network passengers have 
traditionally been overlooked in previous research of low-fare entry and incumbent response, and 
should be accounted for when studying airline markets in general and the effects of entry in 
particular, as they significantly affect average fares, revenues and traffic, as previously 
discussed. 
It is therefore crucial that evaluation of competitive responses to low-fare entry in airline markets 
take into account new entrant capacity, specific fare actions and entrant pricing strategy as well 
as the use of revenue management (or lack thereof) by some or all competitors. 
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